This ExpertREACT article was originally published on 6 January 2012. Epidemiological data and policy positions described reflect the state of knowledge at that date.
H5N1: 61 cases, 34 deaths in 2011
As 2012 began, the World Health Organisation confirmed that 2011 was the highest year for H5N1 deaths since 2007. A total of 61 cases were reported with 34 deaths - a case fatality rate of 55%, far exceeding the estimated 2-3% CFR of the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic. Cumulative laboratory-confirmed H5N1 cases between 2003 and 2012 stood at 578 with 340 deaths. The latest 2011 human case was reported in Egypt, the country with the highest cumulative human H5N1 burden, while December 2011 outbreaks in poultry were reported in Egypt, Indonesia and China. Humans became infected primarily through exposure to infected birds in contaminated environments.
At the molecular level, H5N1's limited human-to-human spread was partly attributable to the virus binding ineffectively to sialic acid receptors on human respiratory epithelial cells. However, VacZine Analytics and WHO experts cautioned that changes within viral proteins - particularly the haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) molecules - could theoretically allow H5N1 to evolve greater transmissibility, precisely as had occurred with H1N1 in 2009. In December 2011, the WHO had stressed the importance of global monitoring of variant influenza viruses and called for heightened vigilance following the suppression of scientific publications describing enhanced H5N1 transmissibility.
Pre-emptive priming versus cost-cutting
Emerging EU discussions around reducing pandemic preparedness spending were criticised in the article as short-sighted. VacZine Analytics argued that cost-saving concerns with reactive pandemic vaccine procurement strategies were misplaced compared to investing in pre-emptive immunological priming. The H1N1 pandemic had demonstrated both the speed at which a novel influenza virus could spread globally and the severe delays inherent in manufacturing a new vaccine from scratch. Given that H5N1's pandemic potential remained a credible and ongoing threat, maintaining priming infrastructure and antigen stockpile strategies was viewed as essential prudent policy.