This article was originally published on 13 June 2013 as part of the VacZine Analytics ExpertREACT series. It is reproduced here for archival purposes. Market conditions, pipeline statuses and regulatory positions described reflect the state of knowledge at that date.
A quiet period ends
After a relatively quiet spell since 2010, vaccine sector M&A activity resumed in 2012-2013 with a cluster of deals providing instructive case studies. The late 2005-2010 period had seen Sanofi's acquisition of Acambis, AstraZeneca's acquisition of MedImmune and Johnson & Johnson's acquisition of Crucell. Then silence - until now.
Takeda: from domestic player to global contender
In late 2012, Takeda Pharmaceutical acquired US-based LigoCyte Pharmaceuticals, gaining a norovirus vaccine programme (Phase I/II) and a virus-like particle (VLP) manufacturing platform. In May 2013, Takeda then acquired US-based Inviragen Inc, which had expertise in dengue vaccines through DENVax - a four-strain recombinant viral vaccine then in Phase 2. Combined upfront payments for both deals totalled approximately $95 million.
The dual acquisitions transformed Takeda from a stagnant local Japanese player into a vaccine company with potential programmes in RSV, influenza, HPV, plague/smallpox, rotavirus, dengue and hand, foot and mouth disease. For the established major players who apparently reviewed and rejected both LigoCyte and Inviragen, this outcome is instructive.
Combined upfront payments for LigoCyte and Inviragen, delivering a diverse global vaccine R&D pipeline to Takeda
GSK Okairos: platform over product
GSK Biologicals' acquisition of Okairos AG in May 2013 for €250 million demonstrates a different strategic logic. Okairos brought a T-cell (CD8) based technology platform - not a single vaccine lead - with applicability to GSK's internal programmes in malaria, tuberculosis, HIV, RSV and HCV. These are all areas where conventional humoral immunity approaches have struggled, and where T-cell responses may be critical. The strategic parallels with GSK's 2005 acquisition of Corixa's MPL adjuvant systems are clear.
"In the case of Takeda, it seems that one man's muck is another man's brass - assets rejected by established players can transform a new entrant."
What drives M&A decisions?
Major player rejection of LigoCyte and Inviragen likely centred on two factors: uncertain commercial viability (norovirus has low mortality; DENVax was potentially second to market behind Sanofi's CYD-TDV dengue vaccine) and clinical/technical risk. New entrants with minimal existing vaccine assets apply less stringent hurdle rates - they need transformative pipeline, not incremental additions.